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So uthea st As i a
C L A U D I A  DE R I C H S
The ruling party in Malaysia, the United MalaysÕ Na-
tional Organisation (UMNO), has set up a website to
demonstrate its various jihad efforts. The mere act of
creating such a website Ð regardless of its content Ð
reveals much about the competition for Ôbeing Islam-
icÕ in Malaysia these days. Since it is primarily politi-
cal parties that are the protagonists in this competi-
tion, Islamization in Malaysia has become a highly
political issue rather than a direct outcome of Islamic
social movements. UMNO and PAS, the Islamic Party,
oppose each other vehemently.
Politicizing Islam
in Malaysia
There is an underlying societal demand for
stronger Islamic commitment on the part of
Malay politicians. The term ÔMalayÕ should
be stressed in this context, as it is mainly the
ethnic Malays (55% of the Malaysian popu-
lation) who consider themselves t h e M u s-
lims of the country. Among the other ethnic
groups Ð Chinese (30%), Indians (7%) and in-
digenous people Ð Muslims form a minority.
A Malay is defined by the religion of Islam,
and since the political power is in the hands
of the Malays, Islam has been constitutional-
ly declared the official religion of Malaysia.
The semantics of Islam have transcended
the aura of MalaysiaÕs mosques, s u r a u s, and
private Muslim spaces and entered into the
realm of the political public as a whole.
In a column headlined ÔDr M: PAS "jihad" a
disservice to MuslimsÕ in the (government-
friendly) mainstream newspaper, The Star,
on 12 August 2000, the Prime Minister Ma-
hathir Mohamad was quoted complaining
that what PAS committed was not a holy
war, but were rather activities that advocat-
ed a split in the (Malay) community. On the
other hand, he held that UMNOÕs struggle
could be considered a real jihad, Ômore
structured and long term in nature, and
aimed at both developing the country and
empowering the community with the latest
knowledge and skills to ensure that Muslims
were respected by others.Õ The reason for
hoisting the battle flag is the fear of disunity
among the Malay community. A disunited
Malay community poses a potential threat
to political stability, hence to the balance of
ethnic power relations.
Loss of hope
Responsible for the change of tide are the
recent domestic developments which have
affected the Muslim as well as the non-Mus-
lim public. In particular, the sacking of and
verdict on former Deputy Prime Minister
Anwar Ibrahim provoked a cry of indigna-
tion. When Anwar was co-opted into UMNO
in 1982, he had been known in the country
as an extraordinarily charismatic leader of
the Islamic Youth Movement ABIM. In view
of the multi-ethnic society in Malaysia,
Anwar introduced a model of a civil society
that was devoted to the acceptance of the
diversity of religions and traditions. In his
writing on masyarakat madani, he empha-
sized that a multi-ethnic nation-state such
as Malaysia necessitates civil and societal in-
tegration, while at the same time accentuat-
ing his personal affiliation to Islam which
has played a pivotal role in his political ca-
r e e r .
A Muslim youth leader, Anwar could be in-
tegrated perfectly into the programme of
modernization and Islamization the
Malaysian government sought to carry out.
Until AnwarÕs being dismissed in 1998, the
Mahathir and Anwar orchestra performed a
symphony of mutually sustainable and ben-
eficial concerns. By the mid-1990s, Malaysia
had become considerably Islamized without
getting caught in the trap of Islamist ex-
tremism. When Anwar joined the govern-
ment as Deputy Prime Minister, the domi-
nant reference in the stateÕs agenda was a
combination of ÔMalayÕ and ÔIslamicÕ with a
developmentalist orientation. It was ur-
bane, modernist and democratic in charac-
ter, and bound to an Islamic and ethical
framework. The ousting of Anwar from gov-
ernment and from UMNO is still viewed as a
dismissal of reformist Islamic and democrat-
ic principles. Muslim morale has been se-
verely affected by the fact that Anwar was
accused of sodomy. Malays cried shame on
Prime Minister Mahathir for this accusation
Ð regardless of whether there was some
truth to it or not Ð non-Malays also joined in
supporting Anwar as the most integrative
figure of the ethnically heterogeneous soci-
ety. Putting him in jail for 15 years symbol-
ized the loss of hope that half a nation had
until then maintained for political change
embedded in Islamic moral principles.
The spreading
o r t h o d o x m o o d
During field work in Malaysia, two years
after this watershed-like incident, it became
clear that changes had taken place but in
quite another direction than was intended
in the late 1990s. Observing the scenes at
public universities, the drastically increased
number of female students wearing the
t u d u n g (headscarf) and male students wear-
ing the k o p i a h (skullcap) was striking.
Teachers admit that a trend of demonstrat-
ing oneÕs Muslim identity has emerged and
that it has become exceptional even for fe-
male Malay teachers not to wear the t u d u n g.
Campus events such as annual gatherings
are accompanied by loud n a s y i d music, the
Malay version of Islamic pop music, whereas
proposals to celebrate the Chinese lantern
festival on the campus are declined by uni-
versity authorities. The Ônew juvenile theoc-
racyÕ at the public universities, as political
scientist Farish Noor has dubbed them, mir-
rors the atmosphere of a rapidly growing Is-
lamic assertiveness and conviction among
the Malay populace. In a do-it-yourself man-
ner, ultra-conscious Muslims seem to be de-
termined to counterbalance the indecent
liberties that are expected to arrive with the
free use of IT and the internet. In a Malay-
dominated primary school, new rules on
n o n -h a l a l food have been declared which
remind the non-Muslims not to bring in
such food during break time. This continued
to the extent that reminder notes were
placed on the canteen pillars. On the other
hand, no one shows concern when Muslim
pupils happily munch their beef sandwiches
while sitting next to classmates of Hindu-In-
dian origin.
The spreading orthodox mood and asser-
tion reflect non-material demands of a soci-
ety which has become increasingly aware of
the arbitrariness of state power in times of
crises. Asking young urban Malays why they
are fond of the Islamic party, the reply is that
PAS leaders are able to attract the people
spiritually. Spiritual attraction can translate
beliefs into action, and for many Malays this
is exactly what is required to lead the nation
out of its current crisis. Non-Muslims also
appear to appreciate the rhetoric of PAS, de-
spite some highly provocative remarks of
party leader Nik Aziz Nik Mat. Nik Aziz al-
most regularly draws the attention of the
nation and the media towards himself by
expressing that, for example, pretty women
should not apply for good jobs because
they can be married by rich men who are
able to care for them, and that women who
expose their belly buttons in public must
not be surprised when they are raped by
men. He does not have to wait long before
the voices of protest make themselves
heard, but still his party enjoys an increasing
number of followers and huge audiences
wherever PAS leaders address the people. A
popular saying holds that UMNO leaders
pay the audience for attending a conven-
tion, whereas in the case of PAS, the audi-
ence pays for attending.
New opportunities
For those who want to discuss and to be
informed but do not have access to non-
mainstream media, let alone the internet,
the mosque is the place to go. Censorship is
hardly extendable into the mosques, and if
it were, a mass exchange of i m a m s w o u l d
have to occur to replace the current ones
with exclusively Ônon-politicalÕ ones. The hu-
miliating fate of Anwar Ibrahim and the con-
sequent formation of a large opposition
movement have given birth to a coalition of
forces opposed to the government Ð and
PAS is an important part of it. Together with,
among others, the Chinese-dominated De-
mocratic Action Party (DAP), the multi-eth-
nic PeopleÕs Party (Parti Rakyat Malaysia,
PRM), which is preferred by many intellectu-
als, and the National Justice Party (Keadi-
lan), PAS forms the Alternative Front
( B a r i s a n Alternatif). What keeps the coalition
together is the opposition to the ruling
coalition (of which UMNO is the de facto rul-
ing party) and the struggle for an account-
able, transparent, and pluralist political sys-
t e m .
Holding such divergent parties together is
not an easy task, particularly when multi-
ethnicity is to a large extent associated with
a multi-religious setting. The government
camp tries to take advantage of the internal
conflicts in the opposition coalition and re-
unite the Malays under UMNOÕs roof. For
this reason, the ruling party is now commit-
ted to jihad.
The current competition for religious and
ethical merit and distinction forms a fertile
ground for all sorts of religious-political ide-
ologies to spread, be it in the direction of Is-
lamic radicalism or politically-enriched cults
and mysticism.
The possibility of articulating interests in
an Islamic rhetoric and the aggregation of
these interests through parties, organiza-
tions, and networks offers a political oppor-
tunity structure which the existing political
system does not provide. Functioning as a
valve to release emotions that have been
bottled up, non-Muslims can utilize this op-
portunity structure as well. Through a
process of ÔIslamic lingualizationÕ (islami-
sche Versprachlichung, R. Schulze), a politi-
cal discourse that lacked public recognition
has now been brought before a mass audi-
ence. By way of a coalition, a symbiosis of re-
form movement and Islamic movement has
evolved. Whether this symbiosis is heading
in an ÔexclusiveÕ or ÔinclusiveÕ direction re-
mains to be seen. An exclusive direction
would mean that the Muslims and non-Mus-
lims in Malaysia remain separate from each
other once the aim of toppling the current
government has been achieved. This would
no doubt add fuel to the fire of those who
sternly believe that politics in Malaysia are
ethnically divided Ð and they are many. An
inclusive direction would mean that the op-
position forces would be able to form a vi-
able multi-ethnic coalition. For the time
being, the nation is witness to a competi-
tion between the two major Malay parties,
UMNO and PAS, both seeking to win the
Ôbest Muslim partyÕ award. Sadly, the ethni-
cally and culturally integrative and progres-
sive ideas of a civil society, embedded with-
in an Islamic ethical framework, are increas-
ingly ridiculed in politically instrumental-
ized jihads and by radical ideologues that
take advantage of the attractiveness of Is-
lamic rhetoric. u
